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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
V.

Case No. 950531-CA

ROBERT G. JOHNSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPKTJANT'S BRIEF

1.

Jurisdiction is based upon Utah Code Ann. 1953 §78-

2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
2c

Statement of issues:
Issue I:

Whether the lower court's refusal to

dismiss the information that violated defendant's right ,{to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation" under the
6th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution was reversible error.
Standard of review: Whether conviction should be reversed or
affirmed

in

face

of

violation

of

federally

constitutional right is governed by federal law.

protected
State v.

Genovesir 909 P.2d 916 (Utah App. 1995) Federal law as derived
from Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 82 S.Ct. 1038
(1962), "[i]t is an elementary principle of criminal pleading,
that where the definition of an offense includes generic
terms, it is not sufficient that the indictment shall charge
the offense in the same generic terms as in the definition;
1

but

it must

state

the

species, -

it must

descend

to

particulars."
Issue II: Whether the lower court erred as a matter
of law to defendant's prejudice in its refusal to dismiss the
proceedings on the ground and for the reason the term or
phrase "investment contract" as contained in the statute under
which defendant was charged was void

for vagueness and

therefore in violation of defendant's due process rights
accorded him under the 5th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution;
this issue is presented after the plaintiff sought to prove
"an investment contract as that term is defined by case law"
and defendant moved for dismissal on vagueness grounds.
Standard of review:
governs.

As in Issue I, above, federal law

The standard of review under federal law is as

stated in Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939),
"[w]hen a penal or criminal statute is involved no one may be
required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as
to the meaning of penal statutes.

All are entitled to be

informed as to what the state commands or forbids."
Issue III:

Whether the lower courts ruling on

defendant's motion to dismiss on vagueness grounds, to-wit,
that "the term * investment contract' is defined in case law,
the 'law of the land', and assumed that the definition is
2

adopted by the Utah legislature in passing the legislation
under which defendant is charged

. . . [t]he meaning of

* investment contract7 is not unconstitutionally vague and its
meaning, as defined

by

the Howey

and Accounts

decisions, shall be applied in the case at bar.

Payable

This case

shall proceed to trial," violates the separation of powers
provisions of the Utah Constitution, § 1, Art. V. R. 1579-83.
Standard of review:

It is for the legislature, not the

courts, to define what constitutes criminal conduct.

The

determination of the elements of a crime are under our
constitutional

system,

judgments

exclusively by the legislature.
683 (Utah 1977).

which

must

be

made

State v. Gallion, 572 P. 2d

R. 1633-34; 1618-22.

Issue IV: Whether defendant's right to a fair trial
was invaded and violated by the lower court's allowance of
expert testimony, and its denial of defendant's motion in
limine to exclude such testimony, that an investment contract
was present in the transactions described in the evidence at
trial. R. 2410

See Uptain v. Huntington Labr Inc., 723 P.2d

1322 (Colo. 1986) holding that the objection was sufficiently
preserve when it was raised in a motion in limine before
trial, even though no contemporaneous objection was made when
the evidence was admitted at trial.
3

Standard of review:

The allowance of expert evidence on the

issue of the existence of an investment contract invaded the
prerogatives of the jury, Miller v. Florida,.
(Florida App. 1973).

285 S. 2d 41

The question of whether an investment

contract was present is a question of law on which the opinion
of witnesses was not competent.

Queen v. Commonwealth, 434

S.W.2d 318 (Ky. 1968); 31A Am.Jur.2d. "Expert and Opinion
Evidence", §136 et seq., p. 143.
Issue V: Whether jury instruction 27, objected to at
R. 2619, that
"[ujnder Utah law, the term "security" means any note,
stock, evidence of indebtedness, or investment contract.

In

this regard, you are instructed that the term "investment
contract" means:
1.

An investment of money, 2.

In a comnon enterprise,

3. Where the investor expects a profit, and 4. The profit is
substantially derived from the efforts of another person,",
constructively amends the accusatory pleadings, deprives the
defendant of a preliminary hearing,
violates defendant's right to a fair trial, and his right to
due process of law under the 5th, 6th, and 14th Amendments to
the United States Constitution.
Standard of review: "Unless one has had a preliminary hearing
4

or has waived it, with the consent of the state, he may not be
committed to the district court for trial upon a complaint
charging one offense and then be charged and tried upon an
information charging an offense other than or different from
the

offense

charged

in

the

complaint

upon

which

the

information is based, unless it is an included offense."
State v. Leek. 39 P.2d 1091, 1093 (Utah 1934); State v.
Sommers, 597 P. 2d 1346 (Utah 1979).

A conviction must be

reversed if the court7s instructions to the jury amend the
information to enlarge the offense. Stirone v. United States,
361 U.S. 212 (1960) The instruction fails to explain how the
requirements as set forth therein as to an investment contract
relate to the facts of the case [State v. Winward, 909 P.2d
909 (Utah App. 1995)], and required the jury to agree on any
one of four "securities" which four securities are distinct
from each other and may reasonably be viewed as alternatives
as to which the jury must return separate verdicts. Cf. Schad
v. Arizona, 111 S.Ct. 2491 (1991).

Jury instructions may not

include an element of an offense if that element was not
charged in the indictment." Hunter v. State of N.M.f 916 F.2d
595 (10th Cir. 1990).

The instruction describes and defines

the elements of an investment contract under the Howey and
Payable Accounting

definitions
5

and thereby

violates the

separation of powers doctrine. State v. Gallion. 572 P.2d 683
(Utah 1977)•
Issue VI: Whether, after viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the securities
violations charged beyond a reasonable doubt.
Standard of review: The appellate court reviews the record de
novo under the Jackson [v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979)]
standard.

Flieger v. Delo, 16 F.3d 878 (3th Cir. 1994).
Issue VII: Whether the improper conduct on the part

of

the

prosecutor

appellant's

in

codefendant

introducing
Blake

the

Adams

guilty

was

plea

of

overwhelmingly

prejudicial and tainted the entire trial, severely impaired
appellant's

defense,

denied

appellant

a

fair

trial

in

violation of the 5th, 6th and 14th Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution, requiring the guilty verdict to be set aside and
vacated. R. 2446. Standard of review: Manifest error exists
when the error is plain and made to appear xon the face of the
record and to the manifest prejudice of the accused.'" State
v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155 (Utah 1989); State v. Pilling. 875
P.2d 604 (UtahApp. 1994), "'A finding by the court of plain
error requires that the error be obvious and harmful."
Krulewitch v. United States,

See

336 U.S. 440, 69 S.Ct. 716, 93
6

L.Ed. 790 (1949) and U.S. V. Kroh, 896 F.2nd 1524, 1532-34

(8th Cir. 1990) holding that such evidence "was overwhelmingly
prejudicial and tainted the entire trial" the only obvious
inference was "if Blake Adams admitted guilt, the defendant
must also be guilty."
3*

Determinative constitutional provisions, statutes,

etc,, are
§61-1-13(17) (1983) '^Security' means any
note: stock; treasury stock; bond; debenture;
evidence of indebtedness; certificate of
interest or participation in any profitsharing
agreement;
collateral-trust
certificate; preorganization certificate or
subscription; transferable share;; investment
contract; burial
certificate
or burial
contract;
voting-trust
certificate;
certificate of deposit for a security;
certificate of interest of participation in an
oil, gas, or mining title or lease or in
payments out of production under such title or
lease; or, in general, any interest or
instrument commonly known as a %security,' or
any certificate or interest or participation
in, temporary or interim certificate, receipt
for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to
subscribe to or purchase, any of the
foregoingo
* Security7 does not include any
insurance or endowment policy or annuity
contract under which an insurance company
promises to pay money in a lump sum or
periodically for life at some specified
period."
Amend. V, U.S. Const. No person shall be held
to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment
of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia,
when in actual service in time of War or
7

public danger; nor shall any person be subject
for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.
Amend. 6, U.S. Const. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which
district
shall
have
been
previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to
have
compulsory
process
for
obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
Amend. XIV, §1, U.S. Const. All persons born
or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.
4. Statement of the case:

(a) Nature of the case: By

information defendant was charged with 13 counts alleging
felony securities violations. R. 1-35.

(b)

Course of

proceedings: Trial to a jury resulted in a conviction on all
counts.

(c)

Disposition in the trial court:

Defendant was

sentenced to a prison term of 9 years. R. 2157-58.
8

(d)
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Defendant then moved the lower court for an order
dismissing the proceedings on U.S. Constitutional Due Process
grounds contending that because the term investment contract
was not defined in the statute it was void for vagueness and
would not support the charges made against defendant.

This

motion was also denied the lower court holding that it had the
right and duty to interpret the statute and did so by
employing the definition of investment contract contained in
the U.S. Supreme Court Howey decision, and the Utah Supreme
Court Payable Accounting decision.

Defendant then moved the

lower court for an order dismissing the prosecution on the
grounds

that

the

lower

court's

approach

violated

the

Separation of Powers provisions of the Utah Constitution.
Again, defendant's motion was denied.
At trial, in camera, defendant moved the lower court in
limine to exclude the testimony of the State's experts who
would testify that an investment contract was present in the
transactions described in the evidence. R. 2410. The motion
in limine was denied by the lower court.
At trial, the State introduced as substantive evidence of
the crimes charged against defendant the guilty plea of
appellant's

codefendant

Blake

Adams.

R.

2446.

No

contemporaneous objection was made by defendant's counsel to
10
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elements must be present in securities litigation*
A rational juror then could not find the elements of the
crime charged.
5.

Summary of the argument:
A.

The information violates defendant's right to

know and is void.
B. The statute declaring an "investment contract" a
security is unconstitutionally vague as to defendant.
C.

The lower court's use of the definitions of an

investment contract in the Howey and Payable Accounting court
decisions violates the Separation of Powers provision of the
Utah Constitution as well as the Due Process of Law provisions
of the 5th and 14th Amend. U.S. Const.
D.

The admission by the lower court of expert

testimony that an investment contract was present in the
transactions described in the evidence was prejudicial error
requiring reversal.
E.

Instruction 27 denied defendant a fair trial,

constructively amended the information, allowed proof of an
essential element of the crime charged on an alternative basis
permitted by the statute but not charged in the information;
defendant was thus denied a preliminary hearing; it further
violated

the Separation of Powers provision of the Utah
12

Constitution, contained no p l i c a t i o n part that Instructed
c

cou

xu

^

tue eviderr-
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cuuw <
aw? anr „.

fact, ditect the jury t, convict the defendant ;* violation *:
onstitution.
F.

,

iLw-.i
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essential elements of the securities vi olations charged beyona

Detail of the argument.
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State ¥".>. .

92 I J J

,2,

5 49, • 8 2 S. C t .

1038, 8 L.Ed. 240 (1962).
(Kan. 1993)

State v. Schultz, 850 P.2d 818

In the instant case, the information using only

the generic reference "security" as stated in the statute is
deficient and void.
B.

The term investment contract is nowhere defined

in the Securities Act*

When a criminal or penal statute is

involved no one may be required at peril of life, liberty or
property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes.
All are entitled to be informed as to what the state commands
or forbids.

Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U .S. 451 (1939);

Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983)
C.

The lower court's use of the Howey and Payable

Accounting court decisions to define "investment contract"
violates

the

Utah

Constitutional

Separation of Powers, §1, Art. V.

provision

relating

to

It is for the legislature,

not the courts, to define what constitutes criminal conduct.
State v. Green, 793 P.2d 912 (Utah App. 1990); State v.
Gallion, 572 P.2d 683 (Utah 1977).
D.

The admission of expert testimony

that an

investment contract was present in the transactions described
in the evidence invaded the prerogatives of the jury, Miller
v. Florida, 285 S.2d 41 (Florida App. 1973); the issue as to
whether the transactions were sales of securities was for the
14
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F. The introduction by the prosecutor of the guilty
plea of defendant's codefendant was plain error and requires
reversal.

State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155 (Utah 1989); State

v. Pilling, 875 P.2d 604 (Utah App. 1994).
See Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440,
69 S.Ct. 716, 93 L.Ed. 790 (1949) and U.S. v. Krohr 896 F.2d
1524 (8th Cir. 1990), and Issue VII, ante., p. 6.
G.

A rational

juror could not have found the

elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. There was
no security; there was no security agreed to be purchased or
sold.

The anti-fraud section of the Utah Securities Act [§

61-1-1(2)] is not intended to address fraudulent statements to
induce a party to turn over funds when no securities are
actually purchased or sold.

Levitz v. Warrington, 877 P.2d

1245 (Utah App. 1994) and John v. Blackstock, 664 F. Supp.
1426 (M.D.Fla. 1987).

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307

(1979); Flieger v. Delo, supra, ante. p. 6.
1.

Conclusion:

The accusatory documents filed against

defendant should be vacated and this prosecution dismissed.
8.

No addendum to this opening brief of appellant is

necessary.
Respectfully submitted,
16
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On January 9 1997 two true copies of the foregoing
APPELLANT'S BRIEF hand-delivered to Jan Graham, Utah Attorney
General, attn:
<: .i I y , 111

Tom Brunker, 236 Capitol Building, Salt Lake
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